

# Safety Management Performance Assessment 2020

**ABL Final Report** 



September 2020



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### **Project Management**

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Project Title	Safety Management Performance Audit
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# A. Executive Summary


This section outlines the environmental factors, key themes and overall assessment criteria.

# A.I Environmental Factor (Context)


Every organisation is susceptible to its own set of unique external influences and, when assessing an organisation's maturity, it is imperative that relevant business and environmental factors are understood, as these factors may have an impact on diagnostic results.

This Performance Assessment was conducted in September 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic, therefore as ABL staff were in the majority working from home and international travel for consultants was restricted, the interview phase was conducted remotely using WebEx. As for several months previously this has rapidly become the "new normal" there was little or no perceived loss in interview quality and a remote document review was also conducted.

ABL (Analysebureau Luchtvaartvoorvallen, Aviation Occurrence Analysis Agency) is a separate department of the larger ILT (Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport, Human Environment & Transport Inspectorate) organisation. The task of the ABL is to process, store and analyse the aviation safety reports it receives as part of the State Safety Programme. The ABL is not a regulated aviation organisation with the need for a full Safety Management System, but as it works within the aviation safety sector and, therefore, shall follow the relevant parts of Regulation (EU)376/2014 it is appropriate to assess its performance against this European Aviation Safety Agency Management System Assessment Tool (EASA MSAT) in part. Where necessary the audit team has interpreted the assessment requirements to best fit the context of ABL and its role.



### A.2 Assessment





**Assessment** - The overall performance of the management of safety in ABL, measured against PRESENT, SUITABLE, OPERATING, EFFECTIVE, as defined by the EASA Management System Assessment Tool (MSAT), is currently assessed as being at Low SUITABLE\*, which is below the global aviation industry average assessed by Baines Simmons of High SUITABLE, based on 31 Baines Simmons assessments conducted in the last 4 years. This is a marked improvement from the previous assessment of PRESENT. In the view of Baines Simmons, the current regulatory requirement is at OPERATING; however, few regulators are yet mature enough in their Performance Based Oversight programmes to assess this accurately.

As ABL is not an entity that owns and mitigates risk, rather a support function to the aviation sector, to enable understanding of its own risk exposure, interpretation has been required to fit the safety management system approach to the assessment of ABL. In ABLs core task of occurrence report handling it achieved an assessed level of OPERATING (which should be commended) but the overall assessment is much lower as there are many safety management elements which, although improved, are yet to mature. The lack of effective risk classification currently is a hindrance.


Within the assessment framework it has been stated if the element was required (under regulation EU376), if the element is logical to include as part of a total safety system (to align with sector partners) or if it was included as a matter of course within the assessment criteria. All of these elements were included in calculating the average assessment level. If an element was outside the scope of the assessment (for example Emergency Response) it was not included in the scoring.

The lower assessment must not be taken as a failing of ABL but due to the context of ABL being part of a wider aviation sector and assessed as such with the MSAT tool. ABL has improved and has a better understanding of the elements of a Safety Management System and has also addressed the non-compliances to the regulation.


\* Low SUITABLE shows that on average indicators assessed were in the lower end of the MSAT definition for SUITABLE which is: There is evidence the system is suitable for the size, nature and complexity of the organisation.

**Assessment Breakdown** – On the next page is a breakdown of the assessment by the MSAT Pillars and Sections:














Figure 2: MSAT Overall Assessment Results Chart

**Key Themes.** A more detailed set of conclusions for each component can be found in Sections I to 5; however, a few key themes, both positive and those that are holding back the management system from moving to OPERATING, are highlighted here:

### Safety Policy and Objectives

The ILT does have a common management system that ABL uses and there is a good structure to this, it is accessible and contains some specific ABL processes; however, it is not set up on the principles of an aviation Safety Management System. There are elements that are lacking in safety and Just Culture policy, safety objectives and formalising the hazard identification, internal safety meeting and Just Culture structure. There has been an improvement connecting the statistical analysis agency to aviation and in particular aviation safety, there is a better understanding of the part they play in aviation safety management.



There is follow up of overdue reports and quality of received reports is somewhat better, reducing the time required for Safety Analysts to data clean. However, there are still some parts of the sector that is not completing all required data in the reports which is a hindrance to proper analysis and any future automation.

The 2 extra Safety Analysts employed in 2019 have had time to gain experience in the aviation environment.

### Safety Risk Management

The core task of ABL is the processing, analysis and storage of aviation occurrence reports and regulation (EU)376/2014 governs this; ABL has addressed several non-compliances in regard to this from the previous assessment. Report information and trends are starting to be used by aviation sector partners with less reliance on their own internal data, as ABL data is perceived to be increasingly more reliable. There remains no additional risk classification placed on incoming reports and trends are based on number of reports rather than severity of risk. Requirements for risk classification and reporting using the European Risk Classification Scheme are yet to be introduced and may require additional resource or competence to achieve.

### Safety Assurance

As there are no set safety objectives it is difficult for ABL to determine required performance; but internal performance is starting to be assessed and there have been improvements to the public website dashboard presenting reporting trends. There currently remains no management of change processes that would enable changes to be risk assessed as to their potential consequences. There are some audit activities taking place, but these are reactive in nature and not specifically targeted at an aviation Safety Management System approach. There is a planned improvement to the ILT Management system.

### Safety Promotion

ABL Safety Analysts have received training in Aviation Safety Management Systems and familiarisation at Schiphol Airport. They demonstrate an understanding of the aviation and safety environment at a more appropriate level. The contact with Aviation Sector Partners has improved though ABL output appears to be more directed at public and layperson level rather than the detail required to support industry, though there are ambitions to improve this and enhancements have been made. A public facing website shows aviation reporting trends, factsheets are produced and there is now an annual safety review of safety report data. The ABL+ meetings are held 8 times a year with commercial and general aviation



representatives where safety data is presented to show trends and there is two-way dialogue which is demonstrating results in building trust and understanding.

### Other

### Interfaces

ABL and the Schiphol ISMS have forged closer ties and are working together on innovative methods to enhance proactive approaches to safety performance monitoring. This includes analysing precursor events that could lead to undesired consequences. Projects such as this add real safety value to an Aviation Sector Partner and also greatly aids ABL's understanding of how the reporting data can be used to improve overall aviation safety. This relationship is an important one in continuing ABL's development.

### Compliance

ABL has received many audits, and has made improvements as a result. These are both external (EASA, TüV), and internal (the project "Basis op Orde Luchtvaart" which translates as "Base in Order Aviation"). There are planned Compliance Monitoring capability improvement activities within ILT in the next year.

### Schiphol Safety Improvement Covenant Questions

In answer to the questions within the covenant and with reference to the performance assessment conducted it can be said:

To what degree ABL succeeds in the objective to timely learn from occurrences to improve aviation safety, together with the sector parties, as it is envisaged with EU 376/14.

This is assessed as SUITABLE in that there is a functioning system to report aviation occurrences and analysis is made by ABL. There is an improvement in output and several non-compliances to EU376/14 have been addressed. The sector needs are not yet fully met but significant improvements have been made and ABL strives for better links.

In regard to Article 12 (of the covenant) which states:

### Art.12: Steps in improvement ABL

*The improvements of ABL consists of:* 

a. Monthly sharing of usable trend analysis of occurrences reported by sector parties, such that sector parties can use these insights to judge if and what measurements need to be implemented to improve safety.

This is currently achieved by a monthly update of occurrence statistics on the publicly accessible website, which has been enhanced. There has been a previous lack of confidence in the quality of the data provided by ABL for the sector parties but this is now improving as ABL demonstrates robust results.

### *b. further development of the analysis function of ABL by:*

o smarter use of data, for which collaboration with other oversight authorities is sought



ABL has provided improved access for ILT Inspectors to the report database but a closer relationship and demonstration of improvements made is needed to progress this. There should also be more input from sector parties to address specific needs. ABL needs to build a capability to analyse risk as well as quantitative report data.

• the development of concrete innovative products and techniques and the usage of them There has been work completed with the Schiphol ISMS to analyse precursor events which is a great example of innovation as well as linking to Bow-Tie risk visualisations.

o improving the knowledge of analysis methods

The Safety Analysts receive continuation training in analysis methodology.

o the automation of reporting of occurrences by sector parties

ABL can accept occurrence reports in the required E5X format and some (though not all) sector parties utilise this. ABL can accept reports in various formats and this will remain so, as not all sector parties (for example General Aviation) may have access to an automatic capable system. ABL can receive the updates to reports (required conclusion information) but this is not widely known amongst the sector parties and therefore not always submitted.

- better classification of occurrences, as stated in art 14.
   Competence in aviation matters has improved but there remains a deficiency in the risk classification of reports. ABL may require additional resource and/or competence to fulfil the risk assessment requirement.
- Proactively sharing with sector parties of remarkable developments and results of analysis, besides the trend analysis.

Factsheets are produced and there is a greater understanding of this requirement. There is now an Annual report but there should be an ambition to include deeper analysis above report trends.

In regard to Article 14 (of the covenant) which states:

### Art.14: connection between ABL and iSMS concerning data on Schiphol

### 1. The sector parties report in accordance with current regulation to ABL

The sector parties report occurrences in accordance to the current regulation, follow up of any late reporting is conducted, so far, this has been conducted in an 'encouraging and collaborative' manner in an attempt to maintain and encourage a positive reporting culture. ILT Inspectors are not currently involved in any enforcement of this.

2. The sector parties report, within the framework of 1, occurrences in automated fashion to ABL, as soon as this is technically possible and the operational requirements are agreed between ABL and the sector parties.

ABL has the capability to receive automated reports and does so from the sector parties though an improvement in the operational requirements could assist in standardising the inputs. The proposed new version of the ECCAIRS should simplify the process.

3. Within the framework of 1, sector parties report results of root cause analysis digitally to ABL, to be incorporated in the database of ABL.

ABL possesses the capability to receive the conclusion update to reports automatically though there was confusion in the sector parties as to this requirement and ability.

4. ABL delivers monthly trend analysis to sector parties and reports remarkable developments, as stated in art.12, directly.

ABL is now providing a data output to the ISMS.

5. In 2018, ILT makes separate agreements with sector parties concerning:



a. Operational agreements to further organize a good connection between ABL and ISMS. b. Mutual exchange of analysis to come to good understanding of questions and specification of answers needed.

c. Usage of information of ABL from Dutch and European databases, in accordance with requirements of EU 376/14.

Agreements made and producing output. Within ISMS, sector parties have signed Non-Disclosure Agreements to gain insight from reports and investigations.

### Overall

With an overall MSAT assessment of Low SUITABLE there is obviously scope for improvement with how ABL works with safety management. That said, ABL has made great improvements in the last year and has prioritised the most important areas to focus with limited resource, which shows commitment and demonstrates a desire to improve aviation safety. The key area for ABL of safety reporting is assessed as OPERATING which is their core task. It should again be stressed that a full Safety Management System may not be appropriate for an agency such as this but as it interfaces with the SMS' of the aviation sector it must understand those systems and the requirements of where ABL can add value and assist those SMS' with viable, usable data. ABL continues with good, enthusiastic staff that have gained more knowledge of aviation systems and have enhanced their competence.

In respect to the evaluation criteria of the Schiphol Safety Improvement Covenant the following assessment is made:

ABL has improved so that all parties can better draw timely lessons from incidents with a view to improving aviation safety. Improvements are evident but there is still more to do so that timely lessons are achieved effectively.

The department does provide data on the frequency, but to a lesser extent the severity of safety related occurrences which requires improvement. It provides data analysis of trends and these areas are now performing to a level that delivers proactive data enabling key safety performance indicators to be used within the ISMS. Further development continues. Uploading data to the European Database now takes place within the required timeframes.

Overall improvements have been made in line with the covenant and demonstrable effort has been made both in improving output and relationships with sector parties. There is still much to do in creating risk assessment capability but the fundamentals of ABL's role are in a much better position from the previous assessment.



# B. Objective and Scope

### B.I Background

ABL have engaged Baines Simmons to conduct a Performance Audit (PA) utilising the EASA Management System Assessment tool (MSAT).

# B.2 Scope

	Location
ABL staff	Virtual
ILT Manager	Virtual
Interfaces: ILT Inspectors, Schiphol ISMS & ABL+ meeting members	Virtual

The scope of the PA is defined by the groups identified above and the topic areas identified in the MSAT. We have used our professional consulting techniques to gather facts and findings on which we have formed conclusions, the issuing of recommendations was outside of the scope of this assessment. Our approach of considering the human-in-the-system during the PA addresses the resultant behavioural markers of staff, to arrive at a considered opinion of the management system performance.

### **B.3** Objective

**The objective of the PA** is to provide ABL with a formal, independent and unbiased confirmation of the level of management system performance that includes:

- A review of how effective the work done by the agency to date has been in building its management systems
- Assessing the extent of any gaps against the ABL desired status of EFFECTIVE on the PSOE scale and against the relevant Regulation (EU)376/2014.

### B.4 Task Breakdown

- **Planning Stage:** The Principal Consultant nominated as Project Manager conducted a project team launch meeting and orientation; scoping, planning and initiation.
- **On-site phase.** Information was captured and documented from one-to-one interviews and focus groups. This involved staff at all levels and any relevant stakeholders to provide a robust assessment of the groups in scope.



- Analysis. Comments, evidence and observations collected throughout our engagement were captured as facts (confirmed using cross checking techniques), plotted against the evaluation criteria below and subsequently grouped in order to develop findings and conclusions.
- **Report Writing Phase:** This report details the findings and conclusions, including an Executive Summary and industry benchmarking.
- **Report Presentation:** The report will be delivered by the Baines Simmons Project Manager to the Executive team.

### **B.5** Deliverables

The key deliverables are:

- A report with key results including:
  - An assessment of the constituent parts of ABL's management systems against the EASA MSAT and PSOE performance markers.
- Report presentation to the ABL Guidance Committee summarising the conclusions.
  - Follow up meeting virtually, fitting in with meeting schedule, to discuss the conclusions.



# C. Definitions and Methodology – EASA Management System Assessment Tool (MSAT)

# C.I Introduction

**Note**: The following information is primarily extracted from the EASA Management System Assessment Tool (MSAT) ver I.0 as intended for guidance to regulators. Baines Simmons have applied our QIEJ (Question, Indicators, Evidence and Judgement) assessment methodology to the Key Performance Questions (KPQs) of the MSAT.

ICAO Annex 19 promotes a common approach to safety management and safety oversight across aviation domains. This document provides a common assessment methodology focusing both on assessment and continual improvement of the Management System/SMS within the scope of authority oversight.

A common approach to assessing Management System/SMS effectiveness supports competent authorities to evolve from traditional, compliance-based oversight to performance-based oversight, provides a common baseline for Management System/SMS effectiveness assessment and creates a sound basis for mutual acceptance of SMS under bilateral agreements.

The assessment tool is designed to be used by competent authorities but it could also be used by organisations, to assess the effectiveness of their own Management System/SMS, for the purpose of continuous improvement. The resulting assessment could be discussed with the competent authority, in order to obtain a common understanding of Management System/SMS effectiveness. Organisations could also use the tool to assess the Management System/SMS of subcontract organisations.

### C.2 How and when the tool is used

This Management System assessment tool may be used for both initial certification (initial implementation of the Management System/SMS) and continuing oversight.

### C.2.1 Initial certification/implementation

Before issuing the certificate, the competent authority should make sure that all processes are PRESENT and SUITABLE, so that all the required enablers of a functioning SMS are implemented by the organisation. In this initial certification phase, a large part of the SMS assessment could be carried out by a desktop review of relevant Management System/SMS Documentation. However, carrying this out at the organisation provides an opportunity for the inspector to advise and guide the



organisation on its Management System/SMS implementation and support standardised implementation.

### C.2.2 Continuing oversight

After initial implementation, the organisation should start using the Management System/SMS as part of its operations. The competent authority should ensure that within the first oversight planning cycle the organisation's Management System/SMS processes are PRESENT, SUITABLE and OPERATING. An organisation may eventually have EFFECTIVE processes, which is the evidence of an EFFECTIVE SMS. In order to check that SMS processes are indeed OPERATING and/or EFFECTIVE the Management System/SMS should be re-evaluated on a regular basis to assess how well it is performing. The review should assess all of the items in the assessment tool which can be done by a combination of organisational visits, meetings and desk top reviews.

As an organisation's Management System/SMS processes mature and it moves to OPERATING and EFFECTIVE this may also require the 'suitability' criteria to be revisited. Changes to an organisation's approval may also require a reconsideration of the suitability of the SMS processes. So, when significant changes take place the competent authority may determine the need to review the existing assessment to ensure it is still appropriate.

## C.3 Credit for other oversight activities

Valuable information about Management System/SMS effectiveness can be gained from other oversight activities. This may include such activities as routine compliance audits and inspections, occurrence investigations and meetings with the organisation. This should be taken into consideration by the inspector through liaison with other inspectors involved in the oversight of the organisation. Competent Authorities may also consider giving credit where an organisation has received accreditation for meeting an industry standard.

### C.4 Dealing with multiple certificate holders

In the case of an organisation holding multiple approval certificates, the use of the Management System/SMS assessment tool should follow the rule "I Management System/SMS = I assessment". Therefore, if one organisation integrates all certificates within a single Management System/SMS, the assessment should consider the Management System/SMS as a whole.

Yet, it may be the case that different teams of inspectors oversee the same Management System/SMS with regard to different certificates, and a single assessment may be impracticable. In such case, the different assessments should be shared with the various teams of inspectors, and a common message coming from the competent authority(ies) should be provided.



### C.5 Tool guidance

The tool assesses the compliance and effectiveness of the Management System/SMS through a series of features based on ICAO Annex 19 Second Edition and EASA Management System requirements for organisations. It is set out using the 12 elements of the ICAO SMS Framework and some additional EASA Management System requirements. Each feature should be reviewed to determine whether the feature is PRESENT, SUITABLE and OPERATING and EFFECTIVE, using the definitions and guidance set out below.

The tool is used by the competent authority inspector to evaluate and record the assessment. Alternatively, it can be partially completed by the organisation to assess itself and by the competent authority to verify and validate the organisation's assessment.


# C.6 Applicability

The assessment tool can be used to assess any size of organisation. However, due consideration should be given to the size, nature and complexity of an organisation to assess whether the individual feature of the SMS is SUITABLE. Inspectors should refer to any existing EASA regulations that define what the management system/SMS may look like for non-complex organisations when considering if a feature is SUITABLE. The competent authority should also consider any applicable Alternative Means of Compliance as part of the Management System/SMS assessment.

The tool has been designed to capture the generic Management System/SMS requirements. As currently there are no common EASA Management System/SMS requirements there may be some additional sector specific requirements that may need to be considered as part of the assessment.



### C.7 Definitions used in the tool



### Figure 3: PSOE Definitions

For PRESENT, OPERATING and EFFECTIVE a 'word picture' is included to help the inspector determine the correct level. There is no word picture for SUITABLE as this is specific to the individual organisation and impossible to define for all types and sizes of organisations. It is the responsibility of the organisation to determine the suitability and to justify to the competent authority who will then assess it.

The PSOE level should be considered as progressive; it must first be PRESENT, then confirmed as SUITABLE, then it becomes OPERATING and may then be EFFECTIVE. During ongoing assessments the suitability should be reassessed taking into account changes to the organisation and its activities.

An item cannot be considered EFFECTIVE if it is not PRESENT because if it is not documented it cannot be carried out consistently and systematically.

### C.8 Level of detail to be recorded

It is important that the inspector using the assessment tool records evidence of the assessment. Evidence includes documentation, reports, records of interviews and discussions. For example, for an item to be PRESENT the evidence is likely to be documented only, whereas for assessing whether it is OPERATING it may involve assessing records as well as face to face discussions with personnel within an organisation.



### C.9 Addressing findings and observations (for regulators)

The current findings definitions used in EU regulations are not consistent across domains and do not necessarily fit the Management System/SMS assessment which requires more focus on the effectiveness of the processes. Observations should be used to identify areas for continuous improvement and encourage a positive safety culture.

For the initial certification or as part of a transition to new Management System/SMS requirements for existing certificate holders all the processes should be PRESENT and SUITABLE. If any are not then the approval should not be granted or transition accepted. Once a Management System/SMS is OPERATING and transition periods expired, during the assessment if a process is found not to be OPERATING, a finding should be raised.

Where a feature is found not to be EFFECTIVE the inspectors may consider issuing an observation to give rise to suggested improvements. However, findings should not be issued if the process is OPERATING but not EFFECTIVE.

The completed assessment tool with the competent authority remarks from the assessment or at least a summary of the Management System/SMS assessment should be provided to the organisation along with a report that captures any findings and observations. Providing the organisation with detailed comments of the assessment will assist in continuous improvement of the Management System/SMS and supports a positive safety culture at a State level.



# I. Safety Policy and Objectives

### I.I Management Commitment

### Annex 19 reference & text

1.1.1 The service provider shall define its safety policy in accordance with international and national requirements. The

safety policy shall:

e) be signed by the accountable executive of the organization

g) be periodically reviewed to ensure it remains relevant and appropriate to the service provider

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE		
There is a safety policy that includes a commitment to continuous improvement, observe all applicable legal requirements, standards and considers best practice signed by the accountable manager.		It is reviewed periodically to ensure it remains relevant to the organisation.	The accountable manager is familiar with the contents of the safety policy.		
Varification Examples					

• The policy was available on the Intranet. All in Dutch language only.

- Policy statements very brief, linking into working procedures.
- ABL has produced a procedure document, whilst not a safety policy does define the work in the aviation safety environment.

### Conclusion

There was not a specific Safety Policy but within the ILT management system there were policy statements that included safety.

This assessment criteria is logical as being part of the total safety system.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements						
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Org.		
ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(2) and (a)(6) AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(2) 'Management system' - [complex operators] AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (1)(2)(3)(5) 'Management system' point (e) - [non- complex operators]	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(2) and (a)(6) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (2) 'Management system' - [complex organisations] AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(1)(2) (3)(5) 'Management system' point (e) - [non-complex organisations]	ADR.OR.D. 005 'Management system' point (b)(2) and AMC1 ADR.OR. D.005 'Management system' point (b)(2)	ATS.OR.200 'Safety management system' Point (1) AMC1 ATS.OR.200(1) (i) Safety management system SAFETY POLICY — COMPLEX ATS PROVIDERS AMC1 ATS.OR.200(1); (2); (3) Safety management system GENERAL [non-complex ATS providers]	ATCO.OR.C.001 'Management system of training organisations 'point (b) AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.001(b) Management system of training organisations SAFETY POLICY		



#### 1.1.2 The safety policy shall

b) include a clear statement about the provision of the necessary resources for the implementation of the safety policy

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE			
The safety policy includes a statement to provide appropriate resources.		The organisation is assessing the resources being provided to deliver a safe service and taking action to address any shortfalls.	The organisation is reviewing and taking action to address any forecasted shortfalls in resources			
Verification Examples						

- ABL department consists of 2 data entry staff and 3 Safety Analysts.
- The Safety Analysts increased by 2 to the current level of 3 in 2019.
- The Safety Analysts are very competent statisticians but only one has any aviation competence and this is not a requirement for the position.
- Performance measures on time to action an incoming report have been implemented and a picture of
  performance is beginning to form.
- There is the opportunity to reallocate analysts from other departments within ILT to support ABL if required, though this is rarely done as ABL is perceived to be well staffed compared to other departments.
- The ABL analysts may also be used on other tasks within ILT, and some do support other projects.
- The time spent "cleaning" incomplete or incorrect data has reduced but there is still a need for the analysts to do this.
- Output from the ABL has increased with a clear focus on relationship building and greater communication with the Schiphol ISMS.
- The future requirement to use the European Risk Classification Scheme to risk assess and report could increase the need for resource and additional (aviation risk) competence within ABL as currently the Safety Analysts do not add a risk assessment to report.

### Conclusion

The department has statistical competence and the Safety Analysts added last year are gaining in experience and aviation knowledge. It was commented that improvements have been made within ABL (the assessment concurs) but with additional resource those and future improvements would go faster.

This assessment criteria is logical as being part of the total safety system.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements							
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations			
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(2) 'Management system' - [complex operators] AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (1)(2)(3)(5) 'Management system' point (e) - [non- complex operators]	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (2) 'Management system' - [complex organisations] AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(1)(2) (3)(5) 'Management system' point (e) - [non-complex organisations]	AMC1 ADR.OR. D.005 'Management system' point (b)(2)	ATS.OR.200 'Safety management system' Point (1) and related AMCs/GM	ATCO.OR.C.001 'Management system of training organisations 'point (b) and related AMCs/GM			



1.1.3 The safety policy shall

f) be communicated, with visible endorsement, throughout the organization See

2.1.2 for c) include safety reporting procedures

2.1.2 for c) include safety reporting procedures							
PRESENT	SUITAB	LE	OPERATIONAL		EFFECTIVE		
There is a means in place communication of the saf policy.		e on the to all perso	policy is communicated onnel (including relevant aff and organisations).	familiar with t	the organisation are he policy and can describe ns in respect of the safety		
Verification Examples							
<ul> <li>Policy is generic for all of ILT and not specific to ABL.</li> <li>No aviation or safety content within policy.</li> <li>No communication or promotion of policy visible.</li> <li>The new ABL procedure was available and known to all staff and details how safety reports shall be handled.</li> </ul>							
Regarding ABL ther the Intranet was su	e are so few staff to r itable to reach the lim ing and has raised the	Conclu each that the plac ited audience. Th	cement of the policy a addition of the AB	within the Ma	anagement system or has added to		
This assessment cri	teria included as a ma	tter of course of Corresponding EU/EA		nent.			
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodrome	s ATM	/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations		
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (2) 'Management	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(2) 'Management system' -	ADR.OR.D. 005 'Management syster	m' point system' (1)(i)	ety management	'Management system of		
system' - [complex operators] Point (a)(3)	[complex operators] Point (a)(3) Not addressed for non-	(b)(2) and AMC1 ADI D.005(b)(2) 'Manage system' point (a)(4)		stem' SAFETY	training organisations' point (d)		
Not addressed for non- complex operators	complex organisations		AMC1 ATS.OR.2 Safety managen				
			GENERAL [non-o providers]	complex ATS			



1.1.4 The safety policy shall

a) reflect organizational commitment regarding safety, including the promotion of a positive safety culture

	initial regarding survey, i		poolerre ballety balleare		
PRESENT SUITABLE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVE					
The management commitment to safety is documented within the safety policy. A better understandin of the ABLs place in th total aviation safety system has been achieved.		The accountable manager and the senior management team are promoting their commitment to the safety policy through active and visible participation in the safety management system.		Decision making, actions and behaviours reflect a positive safety culture and there is good safety leadership that demonstrates commitment to the safety policy.	
		Verification Example	s		
<ul><li>improved.</li><li>Just Culture ment</li></ul>	tioned briefly in manag		liscussed and the conte		
reports are dealt			l'ataa		
	<i>'</i>	nanagement system po rtners to understand a	and improve safety cult	ure.	
		Conclusion			
Specifically, when ope and promotion of a p	erating in an aviation s ositive safety culture	afety sector it must be has improved to a SUI	e concluded that the or TABLE level in the ABL	ganisational commitment . management system.	
This assessment crite	ria is logical as being p	part of the total safety	system.		
	Co	rresponding EU/EASA Requ	uirements		
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(2)	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(2)	ADR.OR.D. 005	ATM/ANS.OR.B.015(a)(2)	AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.001(b)	
	'Management system' point (a)(2) - [complex	'Management system' point (b)(2) and AMC1 ADR.OR. D.005	GM3 ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a) (2) Management system	'Management system of training organisations' points (c), (e) and (f)	
	organisations]	'Management system'	SAFETY CULTURE and		
(1)(2)(3)(5) 'Management	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (1)(2)(3)(5) 'Management system' point (e) - [non-	point (a)(3)	ATS.OR.200 'Safety management system' (1)(i)		
complex operators]	complex organisations]		AMC1 ATS.OR.200 (1) (i) 'Safety management system'		



#### 1.1.5 The safety policy shall

d) clearly indicate which types of behaviors are unacceptable related to the service provider's aviation activities and include the circumstances under which disciplinary action would not apply.

#### See also Reg. (EU) 376/2014 Article 16.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
A Just Culture Policy and principles ha been defined that clearly identifies acceptable and unacceptable behaviours to promote a Just Culture.	ABL is actively working to understand the requirements of EU376 regarding Just culture and engaging with aviation sector partners to build trust.	There is evidence of the Just Culture policy and supporting principles being applied and promoted to staff.	The Just Culture policy is applied in a fair and consistent manner and people trust the policy. There is evidence that the line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour has been determined in consultation with staff and staff representatives.
	Verification Example	- 25	

- Just Culture mentioned in Management system but no specific policy or principles clearly defined.
- No clear Just Culture within ABL (or wider ILT) to encourage open reporting, there were options of contacting a working environment representative if needed.
- An improvement in the understanding of Just Culture and the EU376 requirement.
- There are meetings held with the Public Prosecutors Office to build trust with aviation sector partners in that
  reports are treated with Just Culture principles.
- Actively engaged to encourage open reporting (both mandatory and voluntary)

#### Conclusion

There is an improved understanding of Just Culture but only very limited description of what it entails in the management system documentation, both internally within ABL and also in the handling of external aviation occurrence reports.

### This assessment criteria is mandatory within Regulation (EU)376/2014

	Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements							
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations				
16(11) AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (2)'Management system' point (a)(4) 'safety	Reg. 376/2014 Article 16(11) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (2)'Management system' point (a)(4) 'safety reporting principles' - [complex organisations]	Reg. 376/2014 Article 16(11) ADR.OR.D. 005 'Management system' AMC1 ADR.OR. D.005(b)(2) 'Management system' point (b)(3)	Reg. 376/2014 Article 16(11) ATS.OR.200 'Safety management system' (1)(i) AMC1 ATS.OR.200(1) (i) 'Safety management system' SAFETY POLICY – [complex ATS providers] ATM/ANS.OR.A.065	Reg. 376/2014 Article 16(11) AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.001(b) 'Management system of training organisations'				



(New Std. 1.1.2)

1.1.6 Taking due account of its safety policy, the service provider shall define safety objectives.

The safety objectives shall:

a) form the basis for safety performance monitoring and measurement as required by 3.1.2

b) reflect the service provider's commitment to maintain or continuously improve the overall effectiveness of the SMS

c) be communicated throughout the organization

d) be periodically reviewed to ensure they remain relevant and appropriate to the service provider.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
Safety objectives have been established that are consistent with the safety policy and there is a means to communicate them throughout the organisation.		Safety objectives are relevant to the organisation and are being regularly reviewed and are communicated throughout the organisation.	Achievement of the safety objectives is being monitored by senior management and action taken to ensure they are being met.

### Verification Examples

- There was no evidence of formal safety objectives having been set for ABL and its work with the aviation sector, though the introduction of an internal ABL procedure does more formally define ABL's direction.
- Internal performance measurement has begun regarding timing for report processing.
- Safety Performance Indicators (SPI's) were not formally being used but some of the output of ABL (public website statistics) could be considered as SPI's.
- ABL is outputting data for Schiphol ISMS to use in safety performance assessment.

#### Conclusion

There has been some improvement in internal performance monitoring and in safety performance output.

This assessment criteria is logical as being part of the total safety system.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (2) 'Management system' point (c)(3) - [complex organisations] AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) Management system point (d) (1) - [complex organisations] AMC2 ORO.GEN.200(a)(5) Management system point (a) - [complex organisations]	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (2) 'Management system' point (c)(3) - [complex organisations] AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(3) Management system point (d) (1) - [complex organisations] AMC2 ORA.GEN.200(a)(5) Management system point (a) - [complex organisations]	AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b) (2) Management system point (c)(3)	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(3) 'Management system' AMC2 ATM/ ANS.OR.B.005(a) (3) Management system AMC1 ATS.OR.200(1) (i) Safety management system SAFETY POLICY — COMPLEX ATS PROVIDERS point (b)(3)	ATCO.OR.C.001 Management system of training organisations AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.001(b) Management system of training organisations SAFETY POLICY	



### I.2 Safety Accountability and Responsibilities

#### Annex 19 reference & text

#### 1.2.1 The service provider shall

a) identify the accountable executive who, irrespective of other functions, is accountable on behalf of the organization, for the implementation and maintenance of an effective SMS

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE			
	engaged with Aviation Sector Partners.	5	The accountable manager ensures that the performance of the SMS is being monitored, reviewed and improved.			
Verification Examples						
• There is a Department He	• There is a Department Head that is in charge of several domains within ILT, of which ABL is one.					

- There is a Department Head that is in charge of several domains within ILT, of which ABL is one
- There is no clear definition of responsibility for an effective management system.
- ABL uses the main ILT management system for its policies and procedures.
- The Department Head has greater engagement with aviation sector partners and overall aviation safety awareness has improved.

#### Conclusion

In the context of a state statistics department a full Safety Management System is not necessarily appropriate, there is a person responsible for the effective running of ABL but not accountable for an SMS. A closer engagement to the aviation safety sector has increased the assessment to SUITABLE.

This assessment criteria is logical as being part of the total safety system.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(1)	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(1)	ADR.OR.D.015 'Personnel requirements' point (a)	ATS.OR.200 'Safety management system' point (1)(ii)(iii)	ATCO.OR.C.001 Management system of training organisations, (a)	
ORO.GEN.210 'Personnel requirements' point (a)	ORA.GEN.210 'Personnel requirements' point (a)		AMC1 ATS.OR.200(1)(ii);(iii) Safety management system	ATCO.OR.C.010 'Personnel requirements' point (a)	
			ORGANISATION AND ACCOUNTABILITIES		
			AMC2 ATS.OR.200(1)(ii);(iii) Safety management system		
			ORGANISATION AND ACCOUNTABILITIES [complex ATS providers]		



1.2.2 The service provider shall

b) clearly define lines of safety accountability throughout the organization, including a direct accountability for safety on the part of senior management,

c) identify the responsibilities of all members of management, irrespective of other functions, as well as of employees, with respect to the safety performance of the organisation

d) document and communicate safety accountability, responsibilities, and authorities throughout the organization,

e) define the levels of management with authority to make decisions regarding safety risk tolerability.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
The safety accountability, authorities and responsibilities are clearly defined and documented.		Everyone in the organisation is aware of and fulfil their safety responsibilities, authorities and accountabilities and encouraged to contribute to the SMS.	The accountable manager and the senior management team are aware of the risks faced by the organisation and safety management system principles exist throughout the organisation so that safety is part of the everyday language.

Verification Examples

- The staff of ABL are aware of their responsibilities within their management system but it is unclear as to safety responsibility due to the generic nature of the system.
- ABL's work has a relation to the safety of the wider aviation sector and this is defined in the ABL procedure document.
- ABL owns no risk and therefore has no need to define risk tolerability responsibility within their organisation. ABL does process external aviation occurrence reports but due to current resource and competence levels is unable to risk classify these. There is a fast track for "interesting" reports from the data input team to the analysts and this is followed up on at the two weekly meeting.
- Future requirements to conduct a risk analysis on received reports using the European Risk Classification System will add additional training and resource burden to the department. Overall Aviation safety Awareness has improved.

#### Conclusion

There is limited focus on aviation safety within the management system; however, the staff of ABL are aware of what they need to achieve in their day-to-day roles. There is a continuing increase in the focus on and awareness of aviation safety within the department.

This assessment criteria included as a matter of course of the maturity assessment.

	Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements				
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
b)	b)	b)	b)	b)	
ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(1)	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(1)	ADR.OR.D. 005 'Management system' point (b)(1)	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(1) and (b), ATS.OR.200 'Safety management system' (1)(ii)	ATCO.OR.C.001 'Management system of training organisations 'point (a)	
c)	c)	c)	c)	c)	
ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(1)	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(1)	ADR.OR.D. 005 'Management system' (b)(1) and ADR. OR.D.015 'Personnel	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(1) and ATS.OR.200(1)(ii)	ATCO.OR.C.001 'Management system of training organisations	
ORO.GEN.210 'Personnel requirements' points (a) and (b)	ORA.GEN.210 'Personnel requirements' points (a) and (b)	requirements' (a);(b)		'point (b) ATCO.OR.C.010 Personnel requirements, point (a) and (b)	
d)	d)	d)	d)	d)	
ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(5)	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(5)	ADR.OR.D.005'Management system' point (c),AMC1 ADR. OR.D.005(c) 'Management system' and AMC2 ADR.	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(1) and ATS.OR.200 'Safety management system' (1)(ii)	ATCO.OR.C.001 'Management system of training organisations', point (e)	
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(5) AMC2 ORO.GEN.200(a)(5)	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(5) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(5)	OR.D.005(c) 'Management system'			
[complex operators]	[complex organisations]				

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e)	e)	e)	e)	e)
(3) 'Management system'	AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (3) 'Management system' point (b)(2) - [complex operators]	AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(4) 'Management system'	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(1) and ATS.OR.200 'Safety management system' 1)(ii)	ATCO.OR.C.001 'Management system of training organisations'
(1)(2)(3)(5) 'Management	AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (1)(2)(3)(5) 'Management system' point (d) - [non- complex organisations]			



### I.3 Appointment of Key Personnel

#### Annex 19 reference & text

1.3.1 The service provider shall appoint a safety manager who is responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE				
A competent safety manager who is responsible for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS has been appointed with a direct reporting line with the accountable manager.       See Annex 19 Note:       The safety manager has implemented and is maintaining the SMS. The safety manager is in regular communication with the accountable manager and escalates safety issues when appropriate.       The safety manager is competent to manage the SMS and identifying improvements in a timely manner.         Verification Examples       The safety manager is no Safety Manager nor one required for an organisation such as ABL.       The safety manager and regular communication such as ABL.							
Conclusion Not applicable and not included in overall assessment scoring.							
not applicable and not included in	overall assessmer	it scoring.					
This assessment criteria included a	s a matter of cou	rse of the maturity assessme	nt.				

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
ORO.GEN.210 'Personnel requirements' point (b) AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(1) 'Management system' point (a)(1)- [complex operators] AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (1);(2);(3);(5) 'Management system' point (c)- [non- complex operators]	ORA.GEN.210 'Personnel requirements' point (b) AMC1-ORA.GEN.200(a)(1) 'Management system' point (a) (1)- [complex organisations] AMC1-ORA.GEN.200(a) (1);(2);(3);(5) 'Management system' point (c)- [non-complex organisations]	ADR.OR.D.015 'Personnel requirements' point (c) and AMC1 ADR.OR.D.015(c) 'Personnel requirements'	ATS.OR.200(1)(iii)	ATCO.OR.C.010 Personnel requirements	

Annex 19 Note: Depending on the size of the service provider and the complexity of its aviation products or services, the responsibilities for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS may be assigned to one or more persons, fulfilling the role of safety manager, as their sole function or combined with other duties, provided these do not result in any conflicts of interest.



1.3.2 EASA reference:

Management System AMCs for complex organisations

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
	Safety Meetings are conducted and scope recently expanded.	There is evidence of meetings taking place in accordance with the terms of reference detailing the attendance and frequency of meetings. The safety committees monitor the effectiveness of the SMS and compliance monitoring function by reviewing there are sufficient resources, actions are being monitored and appropriate safety objectives and SPIs have been established.	Safety committees include key stakeholders. The outcomes of the meetings are documented and communicated and any actions are agreed, taken and followed up in a timely manner. The safety performance and safety objectives are reviewed and actioned as appropriate.

#### Verification Examples

- There is a fortnightly meeting between the analysts where safety issues are discussed, which has now been formalized.
- There are 8 ABL+ meetings each year, 4 for commercial aviation and 4 for General Aviation. These are not safety committees per se, more information meetings but are an opportunity for safety issues to be brought up by both sides. These meetings are functioning well.
- First priority for ABL was to improve the relations with Aviation Sector Partners and progress has been made.
- Next priority is to enhance relationship with ILT Inspectors to enable a more informed oversight capability. ABL+ meetings for inspectors are planned.

Conclusion

There are meetings where safety issues are discussed both internally and with aviation sector partners. A focus on improved cooperation between ABL and ILT inspectors is planned.

#### This assessment criteria is logical as being part of the total safety system.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
(1) 'Management system'	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (1) 'Management system' points (b), (c) and (d)	AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(1) 'Management system'	Note; An air traffic services provider should be considered as complex unless it is eligible to apply for a limited certificate and fulfils the criteria set out in ATM/ ANS.OR.A.010(a). AMC1 ATS.OR.200(1)(i) Safety management system AMC1 ATS.OR.200(1)(ii) Safety management system ACCOUNTABILITIES [complex ATS providers] AMC2 ATS.OR.200(1) (ii);(iii) Safety management system ORGANISATION AND ACCOUNTABILITIES [complex ATS providers]	Not applicable	

### 1.4 Emergency Response - not in scope of Performance Audit



### I.5 SMS Documentation

#### Annex 19 reference & text

1.5.1 The service provider shall develop and maintain an SMS manual that describes its:

a) safety policy and objectives

b) SMS requirements

c) SMS processes and procedures

d) accountability, responsibilities and authorities for SMS processes and procedures

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
The SMS documentation includes the policies and processes that describe the organisation's safety management system and processes.	See Annex 19 note	management systems and is representative of the actual	SMS Documentation is proactively reviewed for improvement

#### **Verification Examples**

- The ILT Mavim system incorporates the documentation that covers policy, requirements and processes and procedures.
- The Mavim system is available for all internally on the intranet.
- It was only possible to view the system on-site on the intranet and it was only in Dutch language which is challenging for any external or international audit.
- A (Dutch language) internal ABL Procedure has been implemented to address issues where the generic Mavim system does not cover aviation specific requirements.

Conclusion

The Mavim system was consistent with providing an operational method to administer the work done by ABL with policy, procedures etc that were in proportion to the task of ABL.

The introduction of the ABL Procedure addresses specific aviation requirements and states how ABL shall fulfill its commitment to EU376.

### This assessment criteria is logical as being part of the total safety system.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (5) 'Management system' point (a) AMC2 ORO.GEN.200(a) (5) - [complex operators]	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(5) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(5) 'Management system' point (a) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(5)- [complex organisations]	AMCI ADR.OR.D.005(C) 'Management system', AMC2 ADR.OR.D.005(c) 'Management system'	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(b) AMC1 ATM/ANS. OR.B.005(b) 'Management system' and Annex IV ATS. OR.200(1)(v) AMC1 ATS.OR.200(1) (v) Safety management system	AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.001(e) Management system of training organisations Point (e)(8)	

Annex 19 Note: Depending on the size of the service provider and the complexity of its aviation products or services, the SMS manual and SMS operational records may be in the form of stand-alone documents or may be integrated with other organizational documents (or documentation) maintained by the service provider.

#### Annex 19 reference & text

1.5.2 The service provider shall develop and maintain SMS operational records as part of its SMS documentation.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
The SMS documentation defines the SMS outputs and which records of SMS activities will be stored.		SMS activities are appropriately stored and found to be complete and consistent with appropriate data protection and control.	SMS records are routinely used as inputs for safety management related tasks and continuous improvement of the SMS

- There are examples of SMS output such as factsheets and the updates to aviation sector partners. Databases are maintained with report data. The website displays report trend information. Formal storage criteria are lacking.

### Conclusion

The SMS output definition and storage is present but not fully documented.

	Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements						
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations			
ORO.GEN.220 'Record-keeping' AMC1 ORO.GEN.220(b) 'Record-keeping'	ORA.GEN.220 'Record-keeping' AMC1 ORA.GEN.220(b) 'Record-keeping'	ADR.OR.D.035 'Record keeping' AMC1 ADR.OR.D.035 'Record keeping' AMC2 ADR.OR.D.035 'Record keeping'	ATM/ANS.OR.B.030 Record keeping ATS.OR.200(1)(v) AMC2 ATS.OR.200(1) (v) Safety management system	ATCO.OR.C.020 Record keeping AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.020(a);(b) Record keeping			



# 2. Safety Risk Management

# 2.1 Hazard Identification

### Annex 19 reference & text

2.1.1 The service provider shall develop and maintain a process to identify hazards associated with its aviation products or services. Hazard

identification shall be based on a combination of reactive and proactive methods.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE			
There is a process that defines how reactive and proactive hazard identification is gathered from multiple sources (internal and external).	Examples of ABL output are used for industry Hazard Identification	The hazards are identified and documented. Human and organisational Factors related hazards are being identified.	The organisation has a register of the hazards that is maintained and reviewed to ensure it remains up to date. It is continuously and proactively identifying hazards related to its activities and operational environment and involves all key personnel and appropriate stakeholders. Hazards are assessed in a systematic and timely manner			
	Verification Examples					

- There is no documented process for reactive or proactive hazard identification within ABL.
- ABL has a source of reactive hazard identification from the external aviation occurrence reports.
- Hazard identification is discussed at the fortnightly analysts meeting.
- The examples of factsheets produced by ABL demonstrate the use of report trend data to highlight hazards.
  - Aviation Incidents due to Fatigue of Pilots & Cabin Crew
  - o Drones
  - Unruly Passengers.
- These factsheets are initiated on what ABL staff find as interesting trends, potentially with some input from ILT, but there is no formal initiating criteria.
- The statistical analysis completed on the external occurrence reports focusses mainly on the questions asked by press, public or politicians or to populate the public website. There is some increase in aviation sector input and direction given to ABL to enable proactive identification and analysis of aviation safety hazards.
- There has been cooperation with Schiphol ISMS to analyze if precursor events (Threats) can be used proactively to monitor any risk increase of outcomes (use of Bow Tie Analysis model). This will enable a proactive hazard assessment and enhances the ISMS Safety Dashboard.

### Conclusion

There is no hazard identification process present but there is output that is enabling hazard identification. ABL is gaining guidance and input from the aviation sector to build competence in active hazard identification and analysis of the aviation safety data they possess.

	Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations		



ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(3) AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (3) 'Management system' point (a)(1) - [complex operators]	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(3) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (3) 'Management system' point (a)(1) - [complex organisations]	ADR.OR.D.005 'Management system' point (b)(3) AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(3) 'Management system'	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(5) ATS.OR.200(2)(i) AMC1 ATS.OR.205(b)(1) AMC2 ATS.OR.205(b)(1)	ATCO.OR.C.001 Management system of training organisations point (c) AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.001(c) 'Management system of training organisations'
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (1);(2);(3);(5) 'Management system' points (a), (b) and (d) - [non-complex operators]	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (1);(2);(3);(5) 'Management system' points (a), (b) and (d) - [non-complex organisations]			



# 2.1.2 Regulation (EU) 376/2014 and Annex 19 Appendix 2 Std. 1.1.1.c) safety reporting procedures

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE			
There is a confidential reporting system to capture mandatory occurrences and voluntary reports that includes a feedback system and stored on a database. Responsibilities have been defined as required by Reg. (EU) 376/2014. The process identifies how reports are actioned and timescales specified.	Reports are evaluated, processed, analysed and stored adequately but regulation (EU)376/2014 is not fulfilled.	The reporting system is simple to use, being used and accessible to all personnel. There is feedback to the reporter of any actions taken (or not taken) and, where appropriate, to the rest of the organisation. Reports are evaluated, processed, analysed and stored. People are aware and fulfil their responsibilities in respect of the reporting system Reports are processed within the defined timescales.	There is a healthy reporting system based on the volume of reporting and the quality of reports received. Safety reports are acted on in a timely manner Personnel express confidence and trust in the organisations reporting policy and process. The reporting system is being used to make better management decision making and continuous improvement The reporting system is available for third parties to report (partners, suppliers, contractors).			
<ul> <li>how external aviation sa</li> <li>Reports are evaluated, p</li> <li>There are several and va an operator's own reporensure all have the oppo</li> <li>Report data is stored in Systems) compatible data</li> <li>ABL currently processes reporting capability is an</li> <li>There is improved follow</li> <li>There is performance m follow up (conclusions) b</li> <li>The upload of report data requirements.</li> <li>ABL now produces an an basic and ABL is aspiring</li> <li>The protections given th would be beneficial, the</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>ABL now produces an annual safety review of safety data and trends. The first 2019 report was relatively basic and ABL is aspiring for improvements in future versions.</li> <li>The protections given the reporter are understood but a clearer understanding of Just Culture and its use would be beneficial, the term "Gross Negligence" continues to be used where (EU)376/2014 article 16 refers to a "manifest, severe and serious disregard of an obvious risk and profound failure of professional</li> </ul>					
The safety reporting procedure is deemed OPERATIONAL because reports are evaluated, processed, analysed and stored in a suitable database. The system is accessible and timelines are followed up on. The non-compliances regarding Regulation (EU)376/2014 that were highlighted in the previous assessment have been addressed. Specifically these are: Voluntary reporting procedures now implemented. Follow up on late submission time is being conducted. An annual safety review is published for 2019 and process in place for the future. Uploading to EASA database every 30 days is now taking place. The non-compliances: Follow up on submission of preliminary results and actions submitted and Determination if remedial and/or corrective action needed have been partially addressed and there is capability to receive and process these now but there is some confusion amongst the aviation sector as to the requirement for this and how it is achieved.						



Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements							
Air Operations Aircrew Aerodromes ATM/ANS ATCO Training Organisations							
Regulation (EU) 376/2014 Article 4 'Mandatory reporting', Article 5 'Voluntary reporting', Article 13 'Occurrence analysis and follow-up at national level', Article 16 'Protection of the information source'.							

# 2.2 Risk Assessment and Mitigation

#### Annex 19 reference & text

2.2.1 The service provider shall develop and maintain a process that ensures analysis, assessment [and control] of the safety risks associated with identified hazards.

See Annex 19 note.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE		
There is a process for the analysis and assessment of safety risks. The level of risk the organisation is willing to accept is defined.		Risk analysis and assessments are carried out in a consistent manner based on the defined process. The defined risk acceptability is being applied.	,		
Verification Examples					

- ABL do not make any analysis or assessment on the safety risks, they only include directly any risk assessment made by the reporter. This is due to current resource and competence. There is no risk analysis process or risk matrix in use. Use of the European Risk Classification System is encouraged and will soon be a requirement. It is not clear how ABL will meet this need.
- The numerical analysis capability of ABL has improved and there is output both to the Schiphol ISMS and the ABL website dashboard.

### Conclusion

There is no functioning Risk Analysis process present. The numerical analysis has improved, trending number of reports received but classification by severity is not yet functional. ABL may require additional resource, upskilling and/or risk assessment competence to meet the Risk Classification reporting requirements.

#### This assessment criteria is logical as being part of the total safety system.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements						
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations		
ment system' point (a)(3) AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (3) 'Management system' point (b)(1) - [complex operators] AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (1);(2);(3);(5) 'Manage- ment system' points (a), (b) and (d) - [non-complex	system' point (a)(3)	ADR.OR.D.005 'Management system' point (b)(4) and AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(4) 'Management system'	ATS.OR.200(2)(i)	ATCO.OR.C.001 'Management system of training organisations' point (c) AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.001(c) 'Management system of training organisations'		

Annex 19 Note: The process may include predictive methods of safety data analysis.



#### Annex 19 reference & text

2.2.2 The service provider shall develop and maintain a process that ensures [analysis, assessment and] *control* of the safety risks associated with identified hazards.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE		
The organisation has a process in place to decide and apply the appropriate risk controls.		Appropriate risk controls are being applied to reduce the risk to an acceptable level including timelines and allocation of responsibilities. Human Factors are considered as part of the development of risk controls	Risk controls are practical and sustainable and applied in a timely manner and do not create additional risks. Risk Controls take into consideration Human Factors.		
Verification Examples					
ABL does not "own" risk and therefore has no active controls.					

### Conclusion

Not applicable and not included in overall assessment scoring.

This assessment criteria included as a matter of course of the maturity assessment.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements							
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations			
AMC1 ORO. GEN.200(a)(3) 'Management system' point (b)	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (3) 'Management system' point (b)	AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(4) 'Management system'	ATS.OR.200(2)(i)	ATCO.AR.B.001 Management system, (a)(4); Furthermore, ATSP provisions apply.			



# 3. Safety Assurance

# 3.1 Safety Performance Monitoring and Measurement

#### Annex 19 reference & text

3.1.1 The service provider shall develop and maintain the means to verify the safety performance of the organization and to validate the effectiveness of safety risk controls.

#### See Annex 19 Note.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE		
There is a process in place to assess whether the risk controls are applied and effective.		Risk controls are being verified to assess whether they are applied and effective.	Risk controls are assessed and actions taken to ensure they are effective and delivering a safe service. The reasons for ineffectiveness of risk controls are investigated.		
	Verific	ation Examples			
Conclusion					
Not applicable and not included in o	overall assessment	t scoring.			

This assessment criteria included as a matter of course of the maturity assessment.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements						
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations		
ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(3) AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (3) 'Management system' point (d)(1) - [complex operators]	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(3) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (3) 'Management system' point (d)(1) - [complex organisations]	ADR.OR.D.005 'Management system' point (b)(5) and AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(5) 'Management system'	ATS.OR.200 (3)(i)	Not applicable, however Air Traffic Service Provider provisions apply.		

Annex 19 Note: An internal audit process is one means to monitor compliance with safety regulations, the foundation upon which SMS is built, and assess the effectiveness of these safety risk controls and the SMS. Guidance on the scope of the internal audit process is contained in the Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).



#### Annex 19 reference & text

3.1.2 The service provider's safety performance shall be verified in reference to the safety performance indicators and safety performance targets of the SMS in support of the organization's safety objectives.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is a process in place on how the safety performance of the organisation will be measured including safety performance indicators and targets linked to the organisation's safety objectives.	Internal performance monitoring is initiated.	The safety performance of the organisation is being measured and the SPIs are being continuously monitored and analysed for trends.	SPIs are demonstrating the safety performance of the organisation and the effectiveness of risk controls based on reliable data. SPIs are reviewed and regularly updated to ensure they remain relevant. Where the SPIs indicate a risk control not being effective appropriate action is taken.

# Verification Examples

- There are Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs) being used to monitor safety performance. The performance of the department has started to be monitored with basic performance indicators. The dashboard presents report trends to the public. There is ongoing work with Schiphol ISMS to enhance precursor data for proactive trend analysis.

# Conclusion

Measurement of performance is in place in the department and data from reports is being used to monitor trends.

### This assessment criteria is logical as being part of the total safety system.

#### Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements

Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations			
point (a)(3) AMC1 ORO. GEN.200(a)(3)		ADR.OR.D.005 'Management system' point (b)(5) and AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(5) 'Management system'	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(3) AMC2 ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a) (3) Management system AMC1 ATS.OR.200(1) (v) Safety management system	Not applicable, however Air Traffic Service Provider provisions apply.			



# 3.2 The Management of Change

#### Annex 19 reference & text

3.2.1 The service provider shall develop and maintain a process to identify changes which may affect the level of safety risk associated with its aviation products or services and to identify and manage the safety risks that may arise from those changes.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
The organisation has established a management of change process to identify whether changes have an impact on safety and to manage any identified risks in accordance with existing safety risk management processes.		The management of change process is being used. It includes hazard identification and risk assessments with appropriate risk controls being put in place before the decision to make the change is taken. Human Factors issues have been considered and being addressed as part of the change management process.	The management of change process is used for all safety related changes including Human Factors issues and considers the accumulation of multiple changes. It is initiated in a planned, timely and consistent manner and includes follow up action that the change was implemented safely.
	Va	erification Examples	

- There was no process for management of change.
- There were no examples of management of change evident.
- There is a planned improvement to the ILT Management system next year, which should include Management of Change processes.

### Conclusion

The identification of safety risk from management of change process is not present.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(3) AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (3) 'Management system' point (e) - [complex operators] AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (1);(2);(3);(5) 'Management system' point (b) - [non- complex operators]	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(3) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (3) 'Management system' point (e) - [complex organisations] AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (1);(2);(3);(5) 'Management system' point (b) - [non- complex organisations]	ADR.OR.D.005 'Management system' point (b)(6) and AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(6) 'Management system' ADR.OR.B.040 'Changes' in particular point (f)	ATM/ANS.OR.A.040 Changes — general ATM/ANS.OR.A.045 Changes to a functional system ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(4) ATM/ANS.OR.B.010 Changes - General ATS.OR.205 Safety assessment and assurance of changes to the functional system ATS. OR.210 Safety criteria	AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.001(e) Management system of training organisations point (c)	



# 3.3 Continuous Improvement of The SMS

### Annex 19 reference & text

3.3.1 The service provider shall monitor and assess its SMS processes to maintain or continuously improve the overall effectiveness of the SMS.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE	
There is a process in place to monitor and review the effectiveness of the SMS using the available data and information.		There is evidence of the SMS being periodically reviewed to support the assessment of its effectiveness and appropriate action being taken.	The assessment of SMS effectiveness uses multiple sources of information including the safety data analysis that supports decisions for continuous improvements.	
Verification Examples				

- There was no monitoring of management system performance.
- There was no evidence of continuous improvement of the (ILT) management system.
- There is a plan to improve the ILT Management System next year, with potential additions of Quality Manager and Compliance Monitoring Manager or equivalents.
- The ABL internal procedure is an improvement.
- There has been noticeable improvements in key areas made by ABL in response to the previous Performance Assessment.

# Conclusion

The Management System is the generic ILT one and there was no performance monitoring or continuous improvement present. ABL has made improvements internally.

	Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations		
Reg. 216/2008 Essential requirements for air operations point 8.a.4 ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(3) and (a)(6) AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a)(3) 'Management system' point (f) - [complex operators] AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (1);(2);(3);(5) 'Management system' point (e) - [non- complex operators]	Reg. 216/2008 Essential requirements for pilot licensing point 3.a.1(ii) for ATOs and 4.c.1(ii) for AeMCs ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(3) and (a)(6) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (3) 'Management system' point (f) - [complex organisations] AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (1);(2);(3);(5) 'Management system' point (e) - [non- complex organisations]	ADR.OR.D.005 'Management system' point (b)(7) and AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(7) 'Management system'	ATS.OR.200(2)(iii)	AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.001(e) Management system of training organisations point (b)		



#### Safety Promotion 4.

# 4.1 Training and Education

### Annex 19 reference & text

4.1.1 The service provider shall develop and maintain a safety training programme that ensures that personnel are trained and competent to perform their SMS duties.

The scope of the safety training programme shall be appropriate to each individual's involvement in the SMS.

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is a training programme for SMS in place that includes initial and recurrent training. The training covers individual safety duties (including roles, responsibilities and accountabilities) and how the organisation's SMS operates.		The SMS training programme is delivering appropriate training to the different staff in the organisation and being delivered by competent personnel.	SMS Training is evaluated for all aspects (learning objectives, content, teaching methods and styles, tests) and is linked to the competency assessment. Training is routinely reviewed to take into consideration feedback from different sources.

### Verification Examples

There is a training programme for analysts joining. These training requirements were decided by the line manager.

- The Safety Analysts have attended external SMS training and Schiphol ISMS liaison visits, which has improved aviation safety awareness. A further advanced SMS course is planned. There is an ILT training programme for Analysts to develop further analytical competence.

#### Conclusion

ABL staff receive internal training regarding the management system and procedures but now aviation safety training is included and showing results the assessment is now Low OPERATIONAL.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements						
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations		
ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(4)	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(4)	ADR.OR.D.005 'Management system' (b)(8) and AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(8)	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(6) Annex IV ATS.OR.200 'Safety management system' (4)(i)	ATCO.OR.C.001 'Management system for training organisation', point (d)		
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (4) 'Management system' point (a)	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (4) 'Management system' point (a)					



#### 4.1.2 EASA reference

EASA ORX.GEN.200(a)(4) requirements for maintaining personnel trained and competent to perform their

#### safety and compliance tasks

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is a process in place to ensure that the organisation has trained and competent personnel.		There is evidence of the process being used and being recorded.	The competency assessment programme takes appropriate remedial action when necessary and feeds into the training programme.

**Verification Examples** 

The ILT management system had requirements and records for ILT inspectors but not ABL analysts.

# Conclusion The management system has provision for process and records. ABL staff have received Aviation Safety Training. Training records and requirements were not presented for this assessment.

	Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements						
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations			
ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(4) AMC1 ORO. GEN.200(a)(4) 'Management system' point (a)	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(4) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(4) 'Management system' point (a)	ADR.OR.D.005 'Management system' (b)(8) and AMC1 ADR. OR.D.005(b)(8)	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(6) Annex IV ATS.OR.200 'Safety management system' (4)(i))	AMC1 ATCO.OR.C.001(d) Management system of training organisations PERSONNEL			



# 4.2 Safety Communication

#### Annex 19 reference & text

- 4.2.1 The service provider shall develop and maintain a formal means for safety communication that:
  - ensures personnel are aware of the SMS to a degree commensurate with their positions
  - conveys safety-critical information
  - explains why particular actions are taken to improve safety; and
  - explains why safety procedures are introduced or changed

### See also Reg. (EU) 376/2014 (Article 13(3))

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
There is a process to determine what safety critical information needs to be communicated and how it is communicated throughout the organisation to all personnel as relevant. This includes contracted organisations and personnel where appropriate.		Safety critical information is being identified and communicated throughout the organisation to all personnel as relevant including contracted organisations and personnel where appropriate.	The organisation analyses and communicates safety critical information effectively through a variety of methods as appropriate to maximise it being understood. Safety communication is assessed to determine how it is being used and understood and to improve it where appropriate.

# Verification Examples

- Publicly available website with safety data present. Updated and improved.
- ILT inspectors given access to report database to improve oversight capability.
- ABL+ meetings to present and engage with aviation sector. These continue to improve and foster engagement with aviation sector partners. An ABL+ meeting planned for ILT Inspectors.
- Factsheet production, 3 completed more planned but often constrained by resource.
- An Annual Safety Review (2019) has been published and an aspiration for improvement in 2020.
- There is no process documented in the ILT management system.

# Conclusion

There is communication and engagement at the ABL+ meetings. The public publishing of safety information and factsheets on the website is a good example of safety communication from a state agency and an annual review has now been implemented, closing a previous non-compliance point. This status is just OPERATIONAL but there is further work to do to consolidate this.

### Elements of this criteria are mandatory under Regulation (EU)376/2014.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(4) ORO.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(5) AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (4) 'Management system' point (b)	ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(4) ORA.GEN.200 'Management system' point (a)(5) AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a) (4) 'Management system' point (b)	ADR.OR.D.005 'Management system' point (b)(9) and AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b)(9) 'Management system'	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005(a)(7) ATS.OR.200(4)(ii) AMC1 ATM/ ANS.OR.B.005(a) (7) Management system	Not applicable, however Air Traffic Service Provider provisions apply.	



# 5. Additional Items to be Considered

These additional items included for the assessment relate to EASA Management System requirements or new notes in Annex 19 Edition 2. They are considered important parts of an EFFECTIVE SMS.

# 5.1 Interface Management

#### Annex 19 reference & text 5.1.1 Appendix 2 Note 2.— The service provider's interfaces with other organizations can have a significant contribution to the safety of its products or services. PRESENT SUITABLE **OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVE** The organisation has identified and The organisation is managing the interfaces The organisation has through hazard identification and risk documented the relevant internal and a good understanding of external interfaces and the critical management. There is assurance activity to interface management nature of such interfaces. assess risk mitigations being delivered by and there is evidence that external organisations. interface risks are being identified and acted upon. Interfacing organisations are sharing safety information and take actions when needed.

Verification

 ABL recognises the importance of the engagement with the aviation sector and is working to strengthen this further. Aviation Sector Partners have been the first priority and there have been improvements, communication with ILT Inspectors will be the next phase.

• The interface with the Schiphol project and the ISMS organisation has been a great opportunity to learn and share. This has led to an increased aviation safety awareness among ABL and a joint project using report data to enhance the ISMS data with proactive (leading) indicators. This relationship has progressed from formal meetings, to continual informal contact and discussion.

#### Conclusion

Improvements and actions are starting to show effect and this area is assessed as SUITABLE.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
Not explicitly addressed See ORO.GEN.205 'Contracted activities' and related GM1 & 2	Not explicitly addressed See ORA.GEN.205 'Contracted activities 'and related GM1 & 2	ADR.OR.D.010 'Contracted activities' and ADR.OR.D.025 'Coordination with other organisations'	ATM/ANS.OR.B.005 'Management system' point (f) GM1 ADR.OR.B.040(f) 'Changes' points (b)(2) and (b)(3)	Not explicitly addressed	



# 5.2 Responsibilities for Compliance and Compliance Monitoring Function

5.2.1 Responsibilities and accountability for ensuring compliance are defined					
PRESEN	T SUI	TABLE C	PERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE	
Applicable requirements dentified and properly tr organisation manuals and Responsibilities and accor compliance are defined fo	anscribed into 1 procedures. untabilities for	regularly review applicable requi All staff are awa and accountabil	anuals and procedures are ed in light of changes in rements. re of their responsibilities ities for compliance and to s and procedures.	Enhancements to processes and procedures are suggested from the workforce and management. Individuals are proactively identifying and reporting potential non-compliances.	
<ul> <li>The Requirement for following EU376 is laid down in the ABL Procedure.</li> <li>There is a planned improvement to the ILT Management system including potential Quality Manager and Compliance Monitoring Manager positions. This will assist in ensuring compliance within ABL.</li> </ul>					
Documentation is now in place detailing EU376 requirements. Compliance assurance was not yet present.					
This assessment cri	iteria is logical as being	g part of the total safet	y system.		
Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
DRO.GEN.205 Personnel equirements' point (b)	ORA.GEN.205 'Personnel requirements' point (b)	ADR.OR.D.005 'Management system'' point (b)(11)	ATM/ANS.OR.B.020 Personnel requirements	ATCO.OR.C.010 Personnel requirements, point (b)	



5.2.2 Responsibilities and accountabilities for compliance monitoring are defined

PRESENT	SUITABLE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
It has been documented that there is a person or group of persons with responsibilities for compliance monitoring including the person acting as compliance monitoring manager with direct access to the accountable manager. The accountable manager's accountability and responsibilities for compliance monitoring is documented.		The compliance monitoring manager has implemented and is maintaining a compliance monitoring programme The accountable manager is ensuring there are sufficient compliance monitoring resources and independence of the audit function is being maintained.	The organisation has established a method to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the compliance monitoring activities with feedback to the accountable manager. The accountable manager and senior management actively seek feedback on the status of compliance monitoring activities.

### Verification Examples

- There is a planned improvement to the ILT Management system including potential Quality Manager and ٠ Compliance Monitoring Manager positions. Compliance and quality issues are provided from within ILT centrally. Compliance monitoring generally takes place in preparation for external audits. There have been a series of external audits conducted, including EASA & TüV. There is an internal project "Basis op Orde Luchtvaart" which translates as "Base in Order Aviation" also
- •
- assessing compliance.

### Conclusion

The compliance programme is documented and has output but is not comparable to a full aviation system in that there is no formal audit programme, compliance monitoring is on the ILT system and not aviation or safety specific. Improvements are planned.

This assessment criteria included as a matter of course of the maturity assessment.

Corresponding EU/EASA Requirements					
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations	
AMC1 ORO. GEN.200(a)(6) 'Management system' point (c)	AMC1 ORA.GEN.200(a)(6) 'Management system' point (c)	AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b) (11) Management system point (b) and AMC2 ADR.OR.D.005(b) (11) Management system	AMC1 ATM/ANS. OR.B.005(c)Management system COMPLIANCE MONITORING	AMC2 ATCO.OR.C.001(f) Management system of training organisations COMPLIANCE MONITORING	



5.2.3 Compliance monitoring programme

5.2.3 Compliance monitorin	ig programme			
PRESENT	SUITAB	LE	OPERATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
The organisation has a compliance monitoring programme including details of the schedule of monitoring activities and procedures for audits and inspections, reporting, follow up and records. The way independence of compliance monitoring is achieved is documented.		followed and reg This includes the to address identi operational char Compliance mon	The compliance monitoring programme is being followed and regularly reviewed. This includes the modification of the programme to address identified risks or organisational and operational changes. Compliance monitoring is independent from operational activities and includes contracted activities	
		Verification Examp	les	
assessing compli The compliance prog scheduled.		Conclusion t reactive in that it is t	used to prepare for externa	al audits not regular ar
	eria included as a mat	ter of course of the n	aturity assessment.	
	C	orresponding EU/EASA Re	quirements	
Air Operations	Aircrew	Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations
AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (6) 'Management system' Point (d)(2) (vi) GM2 ORO.GEN.200(a)(6) (Management system' [complex organisations]	AMC1 ORO.GEN.200(a) (6) 'Management system' Point (d)(2) (vi)	AMC1 ADR.OR.D.005(b) (11) Management system point (c)(2)(vi)	AMC1 ATM/ANS.OR.B.005 (c) Management system COMPLIANCE MONITORING	GM1 ATCO.OR.C.001(f) 'Management system of training organisations' point (c)(2)(vi)
GM3 ORO.GEN.200(a) (6) 'Management system' [non-complex organisations]				



5.2.4 Compliance monitoring outcomes e.g. audit results including corrective and preventive actions follow-up.

PRESE	NT	SUITABLE	OPE	RATIONAL	EFFECTIVE
he organisation has d rocedures for the ide ollow-up of corrective reventive actions.	ntification and		The identifying and follow-up of corrective and preventive actions is carried out in accordance with the procedures including causal analysis to address root causes. The status of corrective and preventive actions is regularly communicated to relevant senior management and staff.	The organisation regularly reviews the status of corrective and preventive actions.	
here is a process for esults are communic	ventive actions. re is a process for how audit ults are communicated to the			ive and preventive actions icated to relevant senior	The organisation investigates th systemic causes and contributin factors of findings.
accountable manager and senior management. The interface between compliance monitoring and the safety risk management processes is described.	compliance				Significant findings are used in internal safety training & safety promotion sessions.
			The audit results and root cause causal and contributing factors are analysed and considered when reviewing internal policies and procedures.		
					There is regular communication between compliance monitoring staff and staff involved in other SMS activities.
The CARPAR It was unclear	system logs and how overdue au	follows up o Idit findings v	n audit findings wi vould be escalated	th corrective and pre within ILT.	eventative measures.
		·	Conclusion		
he CARPAR sys	stem provides an	operational f	ollow up of comp	liance monitoring out	tcomes.
This assessment of	criteria included a	is a matter o	f course of the ma	turity assessment.	
		Corresp	onding EU/EASA Req	uirements	
Air Operations	Aircrew		Aerodromes	ATM/ANS	ATCO Training Organisations
DRO.GEN.200 Management ystem' point (a)(6)	ORA.GEN.200 'Mana system' point (a)(6)	(11)	1 ADR.OR.D.005(b) Management system' : (a)(1)	AMC1 ATM/ ANS.OR.B.005(c) Management system	ATCO.OR.C.001 'Management system of training organisations' point (f)

points (b) and (e)

COMPLIANCE MONITORING



# D. Recommendations

As concluded in the Executive Summary and indicated by the performance indicators, ABL has a Low SUITABLE management system for controlling operational risk. Recommendations were outside of the scope of this assessment. In our experience, to achieve lasting success, a safety improvement plan should follow the Understand, Build, Power-up, Perform model, with this report being the foundation of the Understand phase, enabling ABL to consider further improvements above the progress already made.



Figure 4: Implementation Phases

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