NL AltMOC ORO.FC.230(b)(1)(ii) Operator proficiency checks – Multi-Pilot Helicopters:

(a) Operator proficiency checks carried out by operators of multi-pilot helicopters under IFR and in the multi-crew role who have established a comprehensive recurrent training and checking programme that fully embodies the principals of multi-crew operations, CRM, and threat and error management, should:

- Make full use of Full Flight Simulators for all recurrent checks and training;
- Have an established flight data monitoring programme which provides feedback to the Operator's training department;
- Establish pre-prepared, scripted and well defined checking profiles that are followed in sequence;
- Establish a checking programme covering normal, abnormal and emergency procedures over a three year cycle comprising up to 6 OPCs;
- Utilise instructors and examiners that have relevant operational and type experience;
- Be conducted by both day and by night in a variety of weather scenarios.

(b) Pilots should be assessed for proficiency in multi-crew cooperation when carrying out normal, abnormal and emergency procedures as established in the checking programme which may include:

- Take-off and landing procedures;
- In flight and en-route procedures;
- Instrument procedures flown procedurally, and under radar control;
- Non precision approaches based on GNSS, ARA, NDB and VOR procedures;
- Holding procedures.

(c) Where applicable, the following manoeuvres should be flown as pilot flying:

- Take-off with simulated engine failure shortly before reaching TDP or DPATO;
- Take-off with simulated engine failure shortly after reaching TDP or DPATO;
- Precision instrument approach to minima;
- Non precision instrument approach to minima;
- A simulated failure of one engine to be included in an instrument approach to minima;
- Missed approach on instruments from minima with one engine inoperative;
- Landing with one engine inoperative.

(d) Abnormal and emergency drills that may be introduced to any element of the check may include:

- System failures, paying particular focus on complex failures that affect a number of systems, such as:

- FADEC / DEC malfunctions;
- Hydraulic systems: loss of fluid, leakage, pump failures, loss of system functionality;
- Electrical supply systems, loss of AC generation, DC generation, battery power and reversionary modes, loss of other systems;
- Autopilot system failures, with particular emphasis on revisionary modes, partial system degradations, mixed mode flying and effects of overriding coupled modes;
- Avionics and navigational system failures;
- Control system failures;
- Mechanical system failures, including transmission failures;
- Tail rotor control or drive failures;
- Fuel system failures;
- Anti-ice and de-ice systems failures;
- Undercarriage malfunctions;

- Fire drills, smoke drills, including engine fires, gearbox and fuselage fires, cabin and baggage bay fires;
- Autorotations;
- Engine relighting drills;
- Unusual attitudes / upset recoveries;
- Pilot incapacitation drills.

GM1 AltMOC ORO.FC.230(b)(1)(ii) Operator proficiency checks – Multi-Pilot Helicopters

ADMINISTRATION

The operator should consider the following elements in the administration of OPCs:

(a) The OPC should focus on known areas of crew weakness, operational concern and aircraft complexity.

b) Recurrent Checking programmes may be aligned to the recurrent training requirements of AMC 1 ORO.FC.230(a)(4).

(c) The operator may assess and record pilots completing the Company OPC as competent in operationally limited roles; for example as Co-Pilot only, or Day only.

(d) The OPC may be structured to comprise a VFR section and an IFR section and both pilots should be assessed as pilot flying and pilot monitoring. Exercises that require a high degree of manual handling skill by the pilot flying should be assessed for each individual pilot, for example rejected take offs, unusual attitude recoveries and instrument procedures flown without any assistance from the flight control systems. Exercises that involve full crew participation should be examined as such.

The visual section may comprise of a series of mini LOFT exercises or discrete checks, utilising the simulator repositioning function as required to make full and best use of valuable simulator time. A variety of take-off and landing profiles may be assessed over

the 3-year period as determined by the operator.

The IFR elements may be flown as a LOFT exercise. Where approach procedures are flown fully coupled it is recognised that the pilot flying is organising the aircraft flight path through the flight control system. In these circumstances the pilot monitoring will be fulfilling a variety of other duties and as such both pilots may be credited with the successful completion or indeed the failure of an event. Allowing the aircraft to follow an incorrect flight path, or exceed acceptable limits must be seen as a failure by the crew as a whole, and not an individual pilot.

(e) The scripted profile should be followed as closely as possible, however an examiner has the flexibility needed to accommodate crew responses and explore alternative solutions and avenues during the check. Straying from a scripted profile by introducing other drills should be discouraged.